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URING the Survey period, federal and state courts addressed a
wide range of issues under Texas tort law. A subtext to many of
those issues was the sufficiency of expert testimony under
Daubert and Robinson. Many cases addressed statutes of limitations is-
sues, including the two year limitations provision of the Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act and the appropriate tolling rules for le-
gal malpractice claims. The Texas Supreme Court addressed several basic
tort issues, including important questions about duty and constructive
knowledge in the premises liability context, what constitutes "extreme
and outrageous" conduct for purposes of the tort of intentional infliction




The question in Boyd v. Texas Christian University was whether Texas
Christian University ("TCU") owed a duty to its students to supervise or
control its scholarship football players in a non-university sponsored
event held off the school campus.1 The other issue was whether TCU had
a duty to provide a safe environment for its students at an off-campus bar
and at a non-TCU sponsored event. The court began by observing that
there is generally no duty to control the conduct of third persons. 2 This
general rule does not apply when a special relationship imposes a duty
upon the defendant to control a third-person's conduct in situations such
as employer-employee and parent-child relationships. The court of ap-
peals saw no such relationship in this case, and rejected the doctrine of
"in loco parentis" as applying solely to minor children. The court also
observed in a footnote that liability is not ordinarily imposed upon par-
ents for the actions of an adult child. 3
Generally, a public utility has a duty to exercise proper precautions to
anticipate and prevent injuries. The degree of care that a public utility
must exercise is ordinary or reasonable. 4 In Grant v. Southwestern Elec-
tric Power Co., Grant presented more than a scintilla of evidence that the
utility company owed her a duty as to her non-economic damages claims.5
1. 8 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App.- Fort Worth 1999, no pet. h.).
2. Id. at 760 (citing Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525
(Tex. 1990)).
3. Id. at 760 & n.3 (citing Villacana v. Campbell, 929 S.W.2d 69, 75-76 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied)).
4. See Grant v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 20 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App.-Texarkana




Thus, summary judgment on Grant's personal injury claim due to ordi-
nary negligence was inappropriate. 6
In Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, Hou-Tex, an oil and gas com-
pany, sued Landmark, a computer software developer, for negligence and
other torts. 7 Hou-Tex drilled a well in the wrong location because of a
defect in software developed by Landmark. The district court entered
summary judgment for Landmark Graphics, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. Because Hou-Tex suffered only economic damages for its costs
of drilling a dry well, the economic loss rule precludes any tort duty by
Landmark to Hou-Tex.8 Under the economic loss rule, economic dam-
ages must accompany actual physical harm to persons or their property to
be recovered. 9
Houston's First District Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment
for the Houston Chronicle in Arlen v. The Hearst Corp., a suit brought by
a driver injured by a Chronicle deliverer in a car accident. 10 An indepen-
dent contractor of the Chronicle employed the deliverer, and the Chroni-
cle asserted that it had no duty to the injured driver.11 The court of
appeals agreed, noting that while the Chronicle controlled the start and
stop time for deliveries, inspected delivery progress, and received reports
on them, this relationship was not enough to trigger liability.12 According
to the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"), if an employer re-
tains control over any part of the work, the employer "is subject to liabil-
ity for physical harm to others for whose safety the employer owes a duty
to exercise reasonable care."1 3 Because the control retained by the
Chronicle did not relate directly to the accident, the Chronicle was not
liable to the injured driver. The court also refused to apply the doctrine
of "peculiar risk," found in section 413 of the Restatement, which imputes
liability to an employer who does not take steps to prevent injury from an
independent contractor's negligence regarding a known, peculiar risk. 14
The court declined to be the first Texas court to adopt this doctrine.' 5
In Lukasik v. San Antonio Blue Haven Pools, Inc., the court held that
swimming pool installers owed no duty as a matter of law to the parents
of a child who drowned in a swimming pool because the installer's con-
duct could not have foreseeably created a risk of injury to a boy that did
6. Id. at 776.
7. 26 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
8. Id. at 107.
9. Hou-Tex could not maintain an implied warranty action against Landmark because
it was not a party in horizontal privity who could sue for breach of implied warranties.
Landmark's disclaimers, which include an "as is" clause, precluded Hou-Tex's claim for
breach of an expressed warranty. The DTPA was inapplicable because Landmark's alleged
deceptive act did not occur in connection with Hou-Tex's transaction for services.
10. 4 S.W.3d 326 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
11. Id. at 327.
12. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 (1965).
14. Id. § 413; Arlen, 4 S.W.3d at 328.
15. Arlen, 4 S.W.3d at 328. See infra n. 294 for a discussion concerning new legislation
addressing changes in employer liability for leased employees.
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not live on the property when the pool construction was completed. 16
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to base the installer's liability on al-
leged misrepresentations about its ability to get a pool alarm. The court,
however, held that the defendants undertook no responsibility to make
the pool safe from all drowning incidents to future visitors and that "such
imposition of responsibility would create devastating social and economic
consequences." 17
In Peavy v. Texas Home Management, the owners of a court-mandated
residence were denied summary judgment after Dickson, a mentally dis-
abled resident, killed a woman while he was on a home visit. 18 The resi-
dence provided healthcare, social services, and psychological and
psychiatric treatment. Dickson's social worker stated that he had never
heard Dickson make threats about specific individuals, nor had he heard
of any threats Dickson had made while on weekend release. However,
the social worker and residence manager were aware that Dickson had
broken the law during home visits, and the manager testified that Dick-
son had been violent on several occasions and threatened to kill another
resident. The residence was the sole decision maker in determining
whether Dickson could go home for visits. The court determined there
was sufficient evidence to raise a fact question concerning the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's conduct.19 As for duty, the court distinguished a
duty to warn a foreseeable victim from negligence in failing to control a
resident. The court noted that cases that have found a duty to control do
not require that a victim be readily identifiable. 20 The defendant was re-
sponsible for controlling Dickson when he became a resident of the facil-
ity pursuant to a court-ordered commitment, and it was under a duty to
use reasonable care to determine if Dickson should continue un-
supervised home visits. The court thus determined that the risk of fore-
seeability and likelihood of injury were within the knowledge of
defendant.21
In the case of Thompson v. CPN Partners, the mother of a movie thea-
ter employee killed in a robbery brought a wrongful death action against
the owner and operator of the shopping center where the theater was
located. 22 The district court granted summary judgment for defendants,
and the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part.23 As to the
owner, operator, and security company, the district court's ruling was af-
16. 21 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.).
17. Id. at 404.
18. 7 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999), appeal abated, 16 S.W.3d 104
(Tex. App.- Houston [1st Dist.] 2000).
19. Id. at 800.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 23 S.W.3d 64 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet. h.).
23. Id. at 67. Reversal for the security guard and the non-moving corporate defendant
was necessary when they had not moved for summary judgment themselves. The Mother
Hubbard clause, which stated that all relief not expressly granted was denied, erroneously
granted more relief than was requested in the summary judgment motion. Id. at 67-68.
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firmed because the owner and operator of the center did not have a duty
to protect the theater employee from criminal acts of third parties, nor
did the contract create one. 24
B. CAUSATION
The plaintiff in Cowart v. Kmart Corp. alleged that Kmart negligently
sold ammunition to a minor.25 The minor customer used the purchased
bullets for target practice, and then unloaded the pistol before he drove
around drinking beer with friends. During the evening he reloaded the
gun and a friend accidentally killed the victim with it.26 The court af-
firmed a defense summary judgment based on the foreseeability element
of proximate cause. The court analyzed the factors set out in section 442
of the Restatement, which describes when an intervening force rises to the
level of a superseding cause. The court found it significant that, unlike
alcohol, the sale of ammunition does not involve a product that impairs
the user. Thus, the intervening act did not bring about the kind of harm
that would have otherwise resulted from Kmart's negligent sale of ammu-
nition to a minor. Finally, the plaintiffs provided no evidence of any fact
that should have alerted any Kmart employee that the customers would
put the bullets in the hands of someone who would engage in criminal
conduct.
The case of Green v. City of Friendswood involved an intersection colli-
sion with a firefighter responding to an alarm about a trash fire.2 7 Appel-
lant sued the firefighter, the City of Friendswood, and the parties
responsible for the trash fire. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendants, and the court of appeals affirmed based on the emer-
gency response defense as to the city and firefighter, and as to the other
defendants, the lack of any evidence showing their negligence was a sub-
stantial factor in bringing about plaintiffs' injury.2 8
The executor for the estates of two people killed in a private plane
crash brought a negligence suit against a company that replaced one of
the vacuum pumps on the plane four years before the crash in Michaels v.
Avitech, Inc. 29 The Southern District Court of Texas granted the defen-
dant's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed summary judgment, examining each of the plaintiff's negligence
theories in turn: (1) Avitech introduced debris contamination into the
pumps when it replaced one of them; (2) Avitech spent an insufficient
amount of time replacing the pump; and (3) the right pump caused the
left pump to fail, which set off a chain reaction resulting in the crash. The
court found that the plaintiff made no attempt to rule out other sources
24. Id. at 72-73.
25. 20 S.W.3d 779 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).
26. Id. at 782.
27. 22 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
28. Id. at 594, 595.
29. 202 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2000).
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of contamination or other causes of pump failure, nor did the plaintiff
provide expert evidence that Avitech spent an insufficient amount of time
replacing the pump.30 The court also opined that the plaintiff's expert
evidence "would likely have been inadmissible at trial under Daubert be-
cause it failed to exclude other causes."31
C, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
1. Personal Jurisdiction
The plaintiff in Greeno v. Killebrew sought to assert specific personal
jurisdiction over a physician who had treated his wife while she was trav-
eling in Mississippi.32 After treatment there, she returned to Texas so her
further treatment would be covered by her HMO, and she ultimately died
in Texas. The Mississippi physician made a phone call to Texas to arrange
for her transfer. This single phone call was not enough to confer personal
jurisdiction, as the Mississippi doctor had not entered a contract with the
plaintiff's deceased wife, made any follow-up inquiries after the transfer,
solicited business in Texas, or maintained a Texas client base.33
2. Duty
The case of Ramirez v. Carreras compared medical and common law
negligence. 34 In a medical negligence claim, a physician's conduct is
judged against the standard of what a reasonable, competent, similarly-
situated medical professional would do.35 When a doctor performs an
impairment examination solely for the benefit of an insurance company,
there is no physician-patient relationship, and thus no duty to conduct the
examination in accordance with this standard. 36 Under general common
law principles, however, the doctor is liable for any injury he may cause
during the procedure even if there is no physician-patient relationship.
The plaintiff's testimony created a fact issue about whether the doctor
had injured a pre-existing back condition during an exam, and the court
of appeals thus reversed a summary judgment for the doctor on the plain-
tiff's common law negligence claim.37
In Kimber v. Sideris, there was conflicting testimony as to whether a
physician was a mere observer to an operation or "voluntarily undertook
a duty or an affirmative course of action," such as directing decisions dur-
ing surgery. 38 Thus, there was a fact issue as to whether the physician had
30. Id. at 753-54,
31. Id. at 753 (referring to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
32. 9 S.W.3d 284 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.).
33. Id. at 287.
34. 10 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
35. Id. at 760.
36. Id. at 762.
37. Id. at 764. Similarly, because there was no physician-patient relationship, the
Texas Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act did not apply. TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 4590i § 1.03(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
38. 8 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, no pet. h.).
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the duty to exercise the care of a reasonable physician toward the
plaintiff.39
In the case of Sosebee v. Hillcrest Baptist Medical Center, parents sued
individually and as next friends of a stillborn child, claiming negligence by
the hospital and a delivery nurse.40 The court affirmed the rejection of
the parents' wrongful death and survival claims, noting that "[t]he Su-
preme Court of Texas has uniformly held for almost thirty years that an
unborn child has no cause of action for prenatal injuries unless the child is
born alive."' 41 Based on Krishnan v. Sepulveda,42 the court further held
that a father could not recover for mental anguish claims in connection
with a stillborn birth. But the court did find that the mother could re-
cover for mental anguish if she proved her own physical injury and
anguish independent of the still birth. 43 The court reversed a summary
judgment against the mother on that claim.44
The case of Escalante v. Koerner45 recognized that under the supreme
court's holding in Edinburg Hospital Authority v. Trevifio,46 plaintiffs may
not recover for mental anguish arising from medical negligence in con-
nection with the mishandling of a deceased stillborn fetus.47 However,
the mother could sue for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as
the evidence raised a fact issue of whether the treating physician acted in
an extreme or outrageous manner in connection with disposal of the fetal
remains. The doctor said the parents waived the right to complain about
the handling of the remains when they signed a consent form authorizing
the hospital to "dispose of, in accordance with the accustomed practice,
any tissue or body parts surgically removed. '48 The court found that the
provisions "surgically removed" and "accustomed practice" are ambigu-
ous, and further noted that the form itself, by including a provision re-
quiring the patient to "certify that the this form has been explained,"
incorporated those explanations by reference into the document and
thereby created additional ambiguity.49
3. Proof Issues
In Blan v. Ali, the court of appeals found that a neurologist was quali-
fied to testify about the standard of care for handling an emergency room
patient who suffered a stroke.50 The pertinent statute does not require
any particular specialization by a doctor witness, so a neurologist with the
39. Id.
40. 8 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet. h.).
41. Id. at 431-32.
42. 916 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex. 1995).
43. Sosebee, 8 S.W.3d at 436.
44. Id. at 435-36.
45. 28 S.W.3d 641 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
46. 941 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. 1997).
47. Escalante, 28 S.W.3d at 643.
48. Id. at 645.
49. Id.
50. 7 S.W.3d 741 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
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appropriate knowledge could testify about the emergency care and cardi-
ology issues present in the case. 51 However, the doctor's affidavit failed
to: (1) identify what aspect of the plaintiff's condition deteriorated as a
result of the alleged negligence; (2) explain how or why the alleged negli-
gence caused deterioration of that condition; (3) identify a better out-
come that could have been produced by different actions; or (4) explain
how or why a different treatment could have produced such an improved
outcome. The affidavit thus failed to raise a fact issue on the element of
causation.52
In the unpublished opinion of Turner v. Peril, the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals criticized the use of a "boilerplate" counter-affidavit to controvert
an affidavit filed pursuant to section 18.001(f) of the Texas Civil Practice
& Remedies Code.53 It observed that section 18.001 created considerable
efficiencies in the "proving up" of the reasonableness of professional fees
and expenses, and held that this goal was thwarted by allowing a counter-
affidavit that did not specifically identify deficiencies in the submitted af-
fidavits and the affiant's qualifications to make those observations. 54
The case of Steinkamp v. Caremark involved a professional malpractice
claim against a nurse for breaking off a catheter in a patient's arm.
55 It
fell within the "res ipsa loquitur" exception to the need for expert testi-
mony in a medical malpractice case.56 The court drew an analogy to a
long line of cases in which instruments were left within a body during
surgery, where expert testimony has not been required to establish negli-
gence, and reversed the summary judgment in the nurse's favor. 57
4. Limitations
The question in Gross v. Kahanek58 was whether prescription refills
created a "course of treatment," thus tolling limitations under the Medi-
cal Liability and Insurance Improvement Act (the "Act").59 To deter-
mine when a course of drug treatment ends, a court considers such factors
as whether the physician continues to examine or attend the patient and
whether the condition requires further services from the physician.60 The
evidence showed that a physician who prescribes the particular medicine
at issue in this case must continually monitor the patient's blood vessels.
51. Id. at 744-47 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN art. 4590i § 14.01(a) (Vernon Supp.
2001); TEX. R. Cv. Evir). 702)).
52. Id. at 748, 749; see generally E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549,
558-59 (Tex. 1995) (faulting a witness's testimony about the cause of death of several trees
for not excluding alternative hypotheses).
53. No. 05-97-00930-CV7, 2000 WL 19532 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 13, 2000, no pet.
h.).
54. Id. at *2.
55. 3 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no pet. h.).
56. Id. at 195.
57. Id. at 195-98.
58. 3 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 1999).
59. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 2001).




The course of treatment thus ran until the last prescription refill authori-
zation date in December 1992, which barred the medical malpractice
claim filed June 13, 1995. The fact that the plaintiff continued to take the
medicine until she died in 1993 was not pertinent to limitations because
the defendant was no longer authorizing refills by that date.61 This con-
clusion does not bar a survival claim based on damages the deceased suf-
fered while alive.62
Moss v. Shah also analyzed when a course of treatment ended.63 The
record revealed only that the plaintiff's retinal detachment had occurred
between a 1992 eye surgery and an office visit on November 22, 1994.
The court of appeals reasoned that a claim for improper monitoring after
surgery could not have begun to run on the date of surgery because the
monitoring would not have been necessary but for the surgery.64 It found
a factual dispute as to when that treatment ended, and reversed the sum-
mary judgment in the physician's favor.65
The question of the length of a continuous course of treatment was also
raised in Wilson v. Korthauer.66 The evidence showed that the plaintiff
consulted with an orthopedist who advised her to continue to wear a
splint prescribed by her primary care physician and to see the primary
care physician for follow-up care. Roughly six months later, the primary
care physician again referred the plaintiff to the orthopedist for treatment
of a "distinctly different" orthopedic condition. 67 The record did not
show that the orthopedist advised the plaintiff to return to see him, or
that her scheduling of the later visit was due to anything other than the
primary care physician's referral. There was thus no continuing course of
treatment so as to extend limitations and make a late-filed suit timely.68
The case of Clements v. Conard69 alleged a failure to diagnose breast
cancer. The first issue was the two-year limitations provision of the Act.
There was no dispute that Conard last saw the plaintiff in May of 1995,
although he remained her primary care physician under her HMO plan.
The court declined to impose "vicarious liability" on the primary care
physician while the plaintiff was seeing another physician. 70 Limitations
thus began to run from at least the 1995 visit, making the 1998 lawsuit
untimely.71
61. Id.
62. See id. (citing TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (Vernon Supp. 2001));
see also Mata v. Simpson, 27 S.W.3d 147, 149-50 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.)(applying Kahanek and finding a continuing course of treatment based on monitoring in
connection with prescription renewals).
63. 7 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1999, no pet. h.).
64. Id. at 693.
65. Id. at 695.
66. 21 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. 21 S.W. 3d 514 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied).
70. Id. at 520.
71. Id. (citing Husain v. Khatib, 964 S.W.2d 918, 919 (Tex. 1998)).
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In the case of Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, the plaintiff sued in 1998 based
upon a failure to notice an implanted IUD during a 1995 physical exami-
nation.72 Because there is no discovery rule under the Medical Liability
and Insurance Improvement Act, limitations barred this claim. However,
the court of appeals found this result unconstitutional under the open
courts provision of the Texas Constitution. 73 Plaintiff had to show that:
(1) she had a well-recognized common-law cause of action restricted by
the statute; and (2) the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when bal-
anced against the purpose of the statute.74 The first element was not in
dispute. As to the second, the defendants claimed that after the 1995
examination, the plaintiff was advised to begin "aggressive" fertility treat-
ment which would have discovered the implanted IUD. The court found
that the plaintiffs should not be required to aggressively pursue all recom-
mended tests within two years, particularly when there were other expla-
nations for her infertility which would not have led her to choose that
course.75 Having found this application of the Act unconstitutional, the
question was whether a "reasonable time" passed before suit was filed,
and the court found an issue of fact as to whether a ten month delay was
reasonable. 76
The parties in Finley v. Steenkamp agreed that the defendant dialysis
center was neither a physician nor a health care provider under the Act.77
Therefore, the general two-year limitations for a personal injury claim
controlled. 78 Nevertheless, the plaintiff argued that after he sent the de-
fendant a notice letter, the Act tolled limitations for seventy-five days.79
The court of appeals observed that the legislative record showed the Act
was intended to apply only to health care liability claims and not to other
areas "of the Texas legal system or tort law."'80 Stating that it "would lead
to absurd results" to find that this tolling provision applied to all lawsuits
against any defendant, the court found the provision inapplicable to a
claim that did not arise under the Act.81
In Grace v. Colorito,82 the court of appeals held that a licensed coun-
selor is not a "health care provider" under the Act, 83 citing one case in-
72. 17 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
73. Id. at 743-45 (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("All courts shall be open, and every
person for an injury done him, and his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have rem-
edy by due course of law.")).
74. Id. at 744 (citing Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W. 2d. 348, 355 (Tex. 1990)).
75. Id. at 744-45.
76. Id. at 745-46; see also Batten v. Hunt, 18 S.W.3d 235, 237 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999,
pet. denied) (holding that a failure to order further tests did not create a "lingering tort"
for purposes of limitations under the Act).
77. 19 S.W.3d 533 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet. h.).
78. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
79. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 4.01(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
80. Finley, 19 S.W.3d at 543 (emphasis omitted) (quoting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art
4590i, §1.02(b)(1), (7) (Vernon Supp. 2001)).
81. Id.
82. 4 S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.-Austin 1999, pet. denied).




volving a psychologist and another about a physical therapist.84 The strict
limitations period of the Act thus did not apply. However, the claim was
still untimely under the general statute of limitations unless the plaintiff's
alleged incapacity or the discovery rule tolled limitations. The court
found insufficient evidence of a lack of capacity. The plaintiff did not
offer expert testimony but simply described therapy she had undergone
in general terms, without specifics about her medication, her reactions, or
specific dates on which the medication caused her to be of unsound
mind.85 The discovery rule did not apply because her alleged injuries of
"false memories" are not "objectively verifiable."'86
D. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
1. Personal Jurisdiction
The defendant attorney in Eakin v. Acosta was licensed to practice in a
Texas federal district court, but his representation only involved one Flor-
ida case, and he did not intend to develop a client base in Texas. 87 These
facts do not create the "continuous and systematic contacts" needed to
support general jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.88 The plain-
tiff claimed that the attorney made phone calls to Texas in which he mis-
represented his experience as an aviation litigator and his degree of
loyalty. The court observed that long-distance phone calls to the forum
state do not necessarily create specific jurisdiction and that "regardless of
the labels [plaintiff] attaches to his claims against [defendant], his suit is
one for professional negligence."' 89 Thus, in the absence of fraud allega-
tions, the alleged misrepresentations were not related to the legal work
that gave rise to his claim. All of that work was done out-of-state. The
court did not attach jurisdictional significance to a fee agreement adden-
dum providing that a Texas lawyer will provide services "subservient to"
a non-resident lawyer.90
But, on the other hand, sending progress reports, correspondence, and
an engagement letter into Texas created a basis for specific personal juris-
diction in the case of Cartlidge v. Hernandez.9'
84. Grace, 4 S.W.3d at 768-69 (citing Lenhard v. Butler, 745 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied); Terry v. Barrinuevo, 961 S.W.2d 528, 530-31 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no pet.)); see also Fenley v. Hospice in the Pines, 4 S.W.3d
476, 478-79 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet. h.) (finding that a volunteer medical di-
rector at a hospice had a physician-patient relationship with an individual admitted to that
hospice for treatment as a terminally-ill patient, thus making him potentially responsible
for a claim that the individual was erroneously admitted into the clinic for hospice care).
85. Grace, 4 S.W.3d at 769.
86. Id. at 770; see Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.
1996); S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 19-20 (Tex. 1996).
87. 21 S.W.3d 405 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet. h.).
88. Id. at 409.
89. Id. at 410.
90. Id.
91. 9 S.W.3d 341, 348-49 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.) (citing




In Brents v. Haynes & Boone, L.L.P., the court of appeals affirmed a
summary judgment based upon the defense of limitations. 92 A legal mal-
practice cause of action accrued when the plaintiffs knew "they were at
risk of harm" from the attorney's conduct.93 In this case, the plaintiffs'
cause of action accrued with the delivery of a letter from an HUD official
stating that a third party upon receipt of the letter "may ... commence a
civil action" against the plaintiffs.94
Several cases addressed whether a malpractice claim against an attor-
ney is tolled during the pendency of the case in which the malpractice
allegedly occurred. 95 The supreme court recently resolved the issue ad-
dressed in those cases and held that limitations is tolled. 96
3. Duty and Public Policy
Former class members sued class counsel in Smith v. McCleskey, Harri-
ger, Brazill, & Graf, L.L.P., alleging improper charges for fees and ex-
penses. 97 Based on authority holding that "[b]oth class action
jurisprudence generally ... and Texas law specifically impose fiduciary
duties on attorneys in their relationship with their clients," the court re-
versed a defense summary judgment. 98
The dissatisfied plaintiff in Lehrer v. Zwernemann sued a mediator, al-
leging that the mediator had misrepresented himself as a "third-party
neutral" when in fact he acted against the plaintiff's best interests at the
mediation.99 The court observed that the mediator had contracted to en-
courage the parties to enter settlement, and a settlement had resulted.
The court dismissed any significance to a prior professional relationship
between the mediator and the plaintiff's lawyer, noting that the plaintiff
had been told of the relationship by his attorney.10 0 Also, other than
saying that he would not have hired the mediator but for the fraud, the
plaintiff did not specify any specific injuries. 10 1
In the case of Van Polen v. Wisch, a criminal defendant and his parents
sued his criminal defense attorney for professional malpractice and
breach of contract. 10 2 Under Peeler v. Hughes & Luce,10 3 the criminal
defendant's suit was barred by public policy because he had not been
92. 10 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).
93. Id. at 776.
94. Id.
95. Brents, 10 S.W.3d at 777-78; Nuflez v. Caldarola, 2 S.W.3d 755, 758-59 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.); Eiland v. Thrpin, Smith, Dyer, Saxe & McDonald,
16 S.W.3d 461 (Tex. App.- El Paso 2000, no pet. h.).
96. Apex Towing Co. v. Tolin, No. 99-1165 (March 1, 2001).
97. 15 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2000, no pet. h.).
98. Id. at 647 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex. 1996)).
99. 14 S.W.3d 775, 777 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
100. Id. at 778.
101. Id. at 777, 778.
102. 23 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
103. 909 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. 1995).
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exonerated of his criminal conviction by direct appeal. 10 4 His parents'
contract claim was not based on professional negligence, however. It al-
leged that the attorney failed to honor his contract with them because he
did not attend the hearing for which they had hired him to represent the
defendant. The court noted that "[w]e distinguish between an action for
negligent legal practice and one for breach of contract relating to exces-
sive fees for services," and allowed the parents' contract claim to
proceed.10 5
The case of Tate v. Goins, Underkofler, Crawford & Langdon involved
the recurring question of whether a cause of action for legal malpractice
is assignable.10 6 In 1994, the Texas Supreme Court refused a writ of error
in Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon, thereby agreeing that such an as-
signment was barred as a matter of public policy since it would "embar-
rass and demean the legal profession" to permit assignments that would
encourage clients to align themselves with plaintiffs against their own
lawyers. 10 7 In the recent case of Mallios v. Baker, the Texas Supreme
Court held that even if the assignment involved was invalid under
Zuniga, the plaintiff still had the right to pursue his own malpractice
claim in his own name. 10 8
The assignment at issue in Tate allowed the plaintiff to retain some in-
terest in his malpractice claim and also allowed him to bring suit in his
own name. He thus argued that the agreement was not an actual assign-
ment, but a mere contemplation of an assignment in the future of any
proceeds. However, his former adversary had absolute control over the
litigation, including the "unfettered" right to settle and the right to re-
quire a full assignment of all claims at some future point. The court of
appeals found that this raised the same concerns as Zuniga and found
that the assignment was void as against public policy.109 The court also
found that the plaintiff could continue to prosecute the claim in his own
name.110
E. NEGLIGENT HIRING, TRAINING, AND SUPERVISING
This past year, Texas appeals courts addressed issues surrounding an
employer's direct liability to a foreseeable third party for an employee's
tort, an employer's alleged duty to investigate claims of an at-will em-
ployee before termination, and a related alleged duty to supervise those
who participate in the termination.
Ianni v. Loram Maintenance of Way, Inc. involved Tingle, a man who
had been working on the railroad "all the live long day" with the help of
104. Wisch, 23 S.W.3d at 515-16.
105. Id. at 516.
106. 24 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).
107. 878 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, writ ref'd).
108. 11 S.W.3d 157, 159 (Tex. 2000).




crystal methamphetamine to keep him awake and alert."' In fact, the
entire work crew, including the foremen, used the drug, and noticed that
it made Tingle violent. After Tingle worked for over fourteen hours one
day, his pupils were extremely dilated and glassy, his speech was slurred,
and he could not walk upright.11 2 After returning to the motel where he
was staying with his wife, he and his wife had a violent argument, during
which he shot a police officer who tried to intervene. 1 3 The trial court
granted summary judgment to Tingle's employer, Loram, finding no evi-
dence that the employer had a duty to the police officer, caused the in-
jury, or was grossly negligent." 4 The appeals court reversed. 1 5
The court found evidence that the employer had a duty to a third per-
son because Tingle's supervisors knew of (and shared in) his drug use,
knew that he was incapacitated at the time of the shooting, and per-
formed an affirmative act of control over Tingle by facilitating his drug
use.116 The court noted that Tingle previously had come after a co-
worker's wife with a knife, but another co-worker stepped between them
and gave the woman a chance to quickly leave. But when Tingle's own
wife called the company's employee assistance plan and his supervisors to
ask them to remove him from the rail grinding machine, they refused to
act. Invoking the often-cited analogy that serving alcohol to an intoxi-
cated driver will result in injury "as readily foreseen as injury resulting
from setting loose a live rattlesnake in a shopping mall," the El Paso
court said, "[h]ere, the rattlesnake was not only set loose, it was coiled
and had already struck once."1 17
When examining causation evidence, the court again noted that the
employer's knowledge of Tingle's drug abuse and the attack on a non-
employee raised a fact issue as to whether the injury to lanni was foresee-
able since "[c]losing one's eyes does not negate foreseeability." 8 The
employer's refusal to intervene, test Tingle for drug use, and subse-
quently remove him from his job also provided evidence that Loram was
the cause-in-fact of Ianni's injuries. Finally, the appeals court found that
the employer's failure to act with regard to Tingle's drug use and violence
raised a genuine issue of material fact as to every element of gross
negligence." 9
In Garcia v. Allen, Garcia sued his former employer, claiming, among
other allegations, that the employer failed to fulfill its duty to adequately
investigate a supervisor's report of poor job performance, failed to prop-
111. 16 S.W.3d 508 (Tex. App.-EI Paso 2000, pet. denied).
112. Id. at 511.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 527.
116. Id. at 523-24.
117. Lanni v. Loram Maint. Of Way, Inc. 16 S.W.3d 508, 522-23 (Tex. App.-EI Paso
2000, pet denied).
118. Id. at 524.
119. Id. at 526-27 (citing Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 22 (Tex. 1994)).
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erly hire and supervise its employees, and defamed him.12 0 The claim
arose when Garcia, who had permanent medical restrictions resulting
from injuries at his previous job, underwent another knee surgery and
was subsequently terminated. The trial court granted summary judgment
for the defendant on all claims, and the court of appeals affirmed.
12 1
Considering Garcia's claim that the employer negligently failed to investi-
gate a supervisor's report about his physical inability to perform the job,
the appeals court stated in absolute terms that employers do not have a
duty to investigate before terminating an at-will employee.12 2 As for
Garcia's claim of negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Garcia's
supervisors, the court likewise found that to allow this claim would en-
courage any at-will employee contesting his termination to sue his em-
ployer for failing to adequately hire, train, and supervise the personnel
who made the decision to terminate. 123 The court reaffirmed previous
cases holding that the theory applies only when an actionable tort is com-
mitted and held that "employers do not have a duty to supervise their
employees in a manner that prevents other employees from being termi-




In Huckabee v. Time Warner Entertainment Co., HBO was sued by a
judge profiled in a documentary entitled "Women On Trial," which
chronicled four southeast Texas cases in which family courts granted child
custody to fathers after each father was accused of child abuse. 125 The
court affirmed judgment for HBO, finding HBO had conclusively proved
that the broadcast was made without actual malice.126
Respondents and various amici suggested that the supreme court
should abandon the traditional summary judgment standard in public-fig-
ure defamation cases, which allows a defendant to negate actual malice as
a matter of law by presenting evidence that he did not publish the state-
ment with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for its
truth. 127 Instead, respondents argued the court should adopt the federal
summary judgment standard established in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
120. 28 S.W.3d 587 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. filed).
121. Id. at 590-91, 603.
122. Id. at 591 ("To impose upon employers a previously unrecognized duty runs the
risk of abrogating the traditional at-will employment relationship, which is the norm in
Texas.").
123. Id. at 592.
124. Id. at 593. The court also affirmed summary judgment on a related defamation
claim, finding no evidence from Garcia that the employee's statements about his medical
restrictions were untrue. Id. at 595-96.
125. 19 S.W.3d 413 (Tex. 2000).
126. Id. at 430.
127. Id. at 420.
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Inc., in which the question is "whether the evidence in the record could
support a reasonable jury finding either that the plaintiff had shown ac-
tual malice by clear and convincing evidence or that the plaintiff has
not."'1 28 The supreme court declined to adopt the federal standard, not-
ing that the federal standard would suggest that the trial court must weigh
the evidence at the summary judgment stage, which is contrary to Texas
law. 129 A trial court's only duty at the summary judgment stage is to
determine if a material question of fact exists.130 Additionally, the court
was concerned that the clear and convincing standard would provide little
guidance regarding what evidence is sufficient for a plaintiff to avoid
summary judgment.131 Noting that most of the other jurisdictions had
accepted the clear and convincing standard, the supreme court declined
to adopt Anderson, finding no authority that would constitutionally re-
quire it.1 32
Defendant provided two affidavits describing the research that went
into the documentary, stating that there was no belief that the film con-
tained any false statement, and that no one doubted the truth of any
statements regarding Judge Huckabee. Because the affidavits were from
interested witnesses, the court noted that they would negate actual malice
as a matter of law only if they were "clear, positive, and direct, otherwise
credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and [able to be]
readily controverted."' 133 Because the plaintiff could not present suffi-
cient evidence to raise a fact issue as to whether actual malice existed or
whether defendants purposely avoided discovering the truth, the supreme
court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 134
In the case of Gaylord Broadcasting Co. v. Francis, the court consid-
ered both what constitutes sufficient evidence to create an issue concern-
ing malice and what statements constitute an opinion.135 A television
reporter reported on the work habits of several Dallas County criminal
district court judges, including the plaintiff, and compiled data to support
the conclusion that the "record suggests" plaintiff was "hardly working."
The defendants argued that the statements were not defamatory because
they were opinions, not malicious, were substantially true, and were privi-
leged. The court found sufficient evidence to create an issue concerning
malice, the required standard when public figures are involved, noting
that the evidence suggested that some of the evidence used in the broad-
cast may have been fabricated or improperly extrapolated. 136 The court
also held that "record suggests" was a nominal expression of opinion that
128. 477 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1986).
129. Huckabee, 19 S.W.3d. at 421.
130. Id. at 422.
131. Huckabee v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 19 S.W.3d 413, 422-23 (Tex. 2000).
132. Id. at 423.
133. Id. at 424 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)).
134. Id. at 430.
135. 7 S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied).
136. Id. at 284-85.
1570 [Vol. 54
PERSONAL TORTS
can imply an assertion of objective fact. 137 Finally, the court held that the
statements were not merely criticism of an elected official, but involved
subjective criteria resulting in seemingly scientific statistics, which were in
fact defamatory of the plaintiff.138
2. Absolute Privilege
In Helfand v. Coane, an attorney sued another lawyer and law firm,
alleging defamation and other causes of action. 139 The claims focused on
a letter by the defendant, written to the plaintiff and copied to his client's
in-house counsel, accusing plaintiff of lying to courts. The defendant
moved for summary judgment based on the absolute privilege for com-
munications made in the course of judicial proceedings, and argued that
the remaining claims were also barred because the defamation claim
could not be re-characterized to circumvent the privilege. The court
identified three elements of the privilege: "(1) the act to which the privi-
lege applies must bear some relationship, (2) to a judicial proceeding in
which the attorney is employed, and (3) the act must be in furtherance of
that representation."1 40 The court then reversed a "freeze" on discovery
imposed by the trial court, stating that more than the underlying letter
was required to determine whether the privilege existed, including cross-
examination of the defendant and knowledge of the attorneys he refer-
enced in the letter.141
Addressing the absolute privilege for statements made in a judicial pro-
ceeding, the trial court granted summary judgment to an attorney and her
law firm after they were sued for libel and other torts in Crain v. Smith.142
After the defendant discovered that the plaintiff had prepared and re-
corded a lien on behalf of its client, but was not an attorney or licensed
real estate broker, defendant reported her discovery to the Unauthorized
Practice of Law Committee of the State Bar and sent a letter to the plain-
tiff's "client" demanding damages resulting from filing the lien. The
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment, holding that absolute
immunity for libel applies to complaints made to public bodies with judi-
cial-like functions, and also to communications by counsel that detail al-
leged wrong suffered by a client. 143
3. Qualified Privilege
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Lane, after an employee complained that a
female co-worker spread rumors that he had sexually harassed her, Wal-
137. Id. at 283-84.
138. Id. at 285.
139. 12 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
140. Id. at 157 (emphasis added) (citing Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
141. Id.
142. 22 S.W.3d 58 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
143. Id. at 60-61.
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Mart terminated him following an investigation. 144 The employee sued
for slander and other causes of action and the jury awarded the plaintiff
over $2 million in damages. The court of appeals reversed and rendered
judgment that plaintiff take nothing.1 45 Analyzing the qualified privilege
an employer has to investigate allegations of wrong-doing, the court
found no evidence to support the jury's finding of malice.1 46 Therefore,
Wal-Mart's statements were made with legal excuse and were not action-
able. The court also held that statements made by an hourly employee
with no authority or duty to speak for the corporation were not attributa-
ble to Wal-Mart. 147
A patron of a pro golf shop sued the company that owned the shop, its
general manager, and the company that operated the shop, alleging defa-
mation and other causes of action in TRT Development Co. -KC v. Mey-
ers. 148 After an annual employee family day picnic and golf tournament,
a patron was approached in the parking lot by shop employees who no-
ticed shirts missing from a rack. The club manager then told the em-
ployee's manager. After investigating, the company discovered that the
patron/employee had been drinking during the tournament, suspended
him, and ultimately fired him. The jury awarded a little over $54,000 in
lost wages, finding that the club manager had made defamatory state-
ments, but without actual malice, and had not interfered with the em-
ployee's employment contract. The court found that the statements were
qualifiedly privileged because the manager had ultimate responsibility for
the pro shop, and therefore had an interest in the subject matter of the
communications.1 49 The recipient had a corresponding interest in know-
ing that one of its employees was probably involved in a theft. Addition-
ally, the general manager believed that his statements were true.
In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Transamerican Natural Gas Corp. ("TNG"),
TNG sued Texas Monthly and its reporter about an article on prior litiga-
tion involving TNG. 150 The issue on appeal was section 73.002(a) of the
Civil Practice & Remedies Code, which gives media defendants a quali-
fied privilege when they republish defamatory statements first raised in
judicial proceedings, if the statements are "fair, true, and impartial." The
truth requirement is satisfied if the statement is substantially correct,
which "involves consideration of whether the alleged defamatory state-
ment was more damaging to the plaintiff's reputation in the mind of the
average listener than a truthful statement would have been."115 Several
statements were considered. The article referred to "wire tapping," and
because there was testimony concerning plaintiffs wire tapping activities,
144. 31 S.W.3d 282 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
145. Id. at 297.
146. Id. at 293.
147. Id. at 289.
148. 15 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
149. Id. at 286-87.
150. 7 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
151. Id. at 805.
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the court concluded that the gist of the statement was a fair, true, and
impartial account of the testimony. 152 Another was that an employee
quit the company as a matter of conscience. His actual statement was
that he quit because "he was 'extremely anxious and fearful about
[TNG's] deception to the State of Texas and royalty owners."1 53 The
court determined that the statement was substantially true because it
would make no difference in the mind of the ordinary reader.1 54 The
court ultimately reversed the court's order denying summary judgment
and rendered judgment that plaintiffs take nothing.155
B. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
In Morgan v. Anthony, the Texas Supreme Court addressed the ele-
ments of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 56 The
plaintiff had car trouble and was driving slowly on the shoulder, stalling
from time to time. For an extended period, the defendant pulled in front
of her in his pickup, got out of the truck, approached the car, made lewd
remarks and tried to enter the car. The plaintiff finally made her way to a
diner, told a waitress what had happened, and waited for rescue by her
father. 157
Summary judgment was granted against the plaintiff in the trial court
and the court of appeals affirmed. The supreme court reversed. On the
element of intent, the court concluded that the defendant's actions were
intentional by their very nature, and also noted that he persisted in pur-
suit of the plaintiff after she repeatedly asked him to leave her alone and
told him that he was frightening her. On the element of outrageous con-
duct, the court briefly reviewed its earlier holding in Twyman v.
Twyman,158 which adopted the definition of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress set forth in section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The element of extreme and outrageous conduct requires proof of con-
duct "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go be-
yond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."'159 The court found it had
"no difficulty in concluding" that there was evidence of sufficient outra-
geous conduct in this record. 60
The court also found sufficient evidence of severe emotional distress.
The court of appeals focused only on evidence of distress in the days and
months after the incident, but did not focus on the "great fear and dis-
tress" described by the plaintiff about her emotional state during her pur-
152. Id. at 807.
153. Id. at 808.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 813.
156. 27 S.W.3d 928 (Tex. 2000).
157. Id. at 930-31.
158. 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993).
159. Morgan, 27 S.W.3d at 929 (quoting Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 621).
160. Id. at 931.
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suit by the defendant, particularly when at one point he was able to open
the car door and tried to block her from closing it. 161 That evidence,
coupled with the fact that she sought medical and psychological treat-
ment from several sources, suffered from depression and nightmares, and
had recurring fear and problems with her family, was sufficient to justify
proceeding to trial. 162
The supreme court also addressed intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims in City of Midland v. O'Bryant.163 The alleged outrageous
conduct involved the City's decision to reclassify positions formerly held
by police officers as civilian positions. Noting its earlier precedent in
GTE Southwest v. Bruce,164 which held that the tort "does not lie for
ordinary employment disputes" and in the workplace "exists only in the
most unusual circumstances," the court found that the City's decision was
not extreme and outrageous. 165 The court observed that even wrongful
termination does not automatically constitute intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and that an employer must have the latitude make to
freely the sort of reclassification decision at issue in this case.166
The case of Fields v. Teamsters Local Union Number 988 also dealt
with what constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct in the employ-
ment setting.167 The court reversed a defense summary judgment, noting
that "[n]o case [defendants] cite involves allegations that an employer
threatened to fire an employee if she did not succumb to sexual ad-
vances." 168 Acknowledging that this case fell somewhere in between "a
case of an employer with a gun in hand who threatens an employee" and
"an employer who simply uses foul language around the water cooler," it
believed that the presence of threats of retaliation was sufficient to create
a fact issue on this element of the tort.169 Citing the Restatement, the
court noted that "[t]he extreme and outrageous character of the conduct
may arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a retaliation with
the other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other, or
power to affect his interests.' 170
Similarly, in determining whether "severe emotional distress" had been
suffered, the court noted that the plaintiff had been harassed over a
three-month period and experienced difficulty performing her job as a
161. Id.
162. Morgan v. Anthony, 27 s.W.3d 928, 931 (Tex. 2000).
163. 18 S.W.3d 209 (Tex. 2000).
164. 998 S.W.2d 605, 612-13 (Tex. 1999).
165. City of Midland, 18 S.W.3d at 217.
166. Id. Accord Mims v. Carrier Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 706, 719-21 (E.D. Tex. 2000);
Wakefield v. State Farm Ins. Co., 75 F. Supp. 2d 545, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
167. 23 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
168. Id. at 531.
169. Id. at 531-32.
'170. Id. at 532 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. e (1965), also citing
Bushell v. Dean, 781 S.W.2d 652, 654, 658 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989), rev'd on other




result. 17t Citing the comments of Justice Hecht in Twyman 172 that "out-
rageousness is a subjective, almost personal, notion" as also providing
guidance in the context of determining what constitutes severe distress,
the court found that there was sufficient evidence to make summary judg-
ment inappropriate. 173
Also in the employment setting, the case of Foye v. Montes involved a
supervisor who called his employee several times to ask for a date, left
love notes on her car, and touched her suggestively at a Christmas
party. 174 The court agreed that "[w]ithout a doubt, [the supervisor's] be-
havior could be described as rude, offensive, and annoying," but found
that it fell short of the high standard required by the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.' 75 The court did not believe that the av-
erage member of the community would exclaim "Outrageous!" upon
hearing about the conduct, and cited two cases involving analogous facts
that reached similar conclusions. 176 In contrast, the court found sufficient
evidence to support the trial court's finding that the supervisor assaulted
Montes by slapping her on one occasion and rubbing his hand on her
thigh on another, thereby engaging in "offensive or provocative"
contact.i7'
The court observed in Stephan v. Baylor Medical Center at Garland that
absent a false and defamatory statement in a report, the publication of
that report about a doctor by a hospital cannot be "extreme or outra-
geous" as required for intentional infliction of emotional distress.' 78
Federal courts also addressed the standards for proving an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim several times this year. In Walker v.
Thompson, the Fifth Circuit held that "[i]nsults, indignities, threats, an-
noyances, or petty oppressions, without more, do not rise to the level of
intentional infliction of emotional distress."'1 79 The Northern District of
Texas granted summary judgment to the employer in this race discrimina-
tion case, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the claim of intentional infliction
of emotional distress. 180 Although some of the racial slurs and epithets
alleged by the plaintiffs may have been illegal in an employment context,
and otherwise condemnable, they did not rise to the level of "extreme
171. Id. at 534.
172. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 631 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring and
dissenting).
173. Fields v. Teamsters Local Union No. 988, 23 S.W.3d 517, 534 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2000, no. pet. h.).
174. 9 S.W.3d 436, 438-39 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied).
175. Id. at 440.
176. Id. (citing Gearhart v. Eye Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 814, 823 (S.D. Tex.
1995); Garcia v. Andrews, 867 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
177. Id. at 441.
178. 20 S.W.3d 880, 892 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.) (citing Twyman v.
Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 621-22 (Tex. 1993)).





and outrageous conduct.' 181
In Tompkins v. Cyr, a physician whose practice was shut down due to
anti-abortion protests sued more than three dozen protestors under sev-
eral tort causes of action, including intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.182 After a jury found eleven defendants liable and awarded
Tompkins and his wife $8.5 million, four defendants appealed, claiming
that they were not linked to several alleged anonymous threats and thus
could not be liable for harm resulting from them. The Fifth Circuit held
that "tortfeasors take their victims as they find them," and "the anony-
mous threats-threats of physical harm and even death-made the
Tompkinses family particularly vulnerable to psychological harm from
the losing defendants' unlawful conduct. ' 183 The appeals court also
found no error in allowing recovery of damages for both emotional dis-
tress and mental anguish, finding that some Texas cases treat the two
terms distinctly, but because the Tompkinses recovered damages for the
same type of injuries under their claim of invasion of privacy, the court
vacated the intentional infliction award.1 84
In Skidmore v. Precision Printing and Packaging, Inc., the Fifth Circuit
vacated a jury award for intentional infliction of emotional distress be-
cause it allowed recovery for conduct that could have caused emotional
distress to female employees in general when the instruction should have
limited recovery for conduct that actually caused emotional distress to
the plaintiff.185 With regard to the employer's liability for its employee's
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found no evidence to
support the jury's finding that the employer ratified the conduct by its
silence, which requires that the employer possess all material facts and
yet take no action. 186
In LaBarbara v. Angel, the Eastern District found that a college foot-
ball coach, college officials, and police did not intend to cause the par-
ents' emotional distress when they allegedly covered up the details of an
accident in which the coach collided with a motorcycle, killing their
son.187 Instead, the "intended and foreseeable consequence of the cover-
up was ... to protect Pearce, the head football coach."'1 88
In Texas v. Crest Asset Management, Inc., a Lebanese man who legally
changed his name to "Sam Texas" sued his apartment owner and manag-
ers for race discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress
after they called him, among other racial epithets, an "Arab terrorist"
and made various threats against him, including a death threat. 189 The
181. Id.
182. 202 F.3d 770, 775-76 (5th Cir. 2000).
183. Id. at 780.
184. Id. at 784-87.
185. 188 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 1999).
186. Id. at 615.
187. 95 F. Supp. 2d 656, 659 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
188. Id. at 667.
189. 85 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
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Southern District court found that this type of conduct was extreme and
outrageous, but Texas did not show that his emotional distress was severe,
"more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger."190
C. PREMISES LIABILITY
1. Duty
The supreme court focused on foreseeability in Mellon Mortgage Co. v.
Holder.191 A police officer stopped a woman late at night for an alleged
traffic violation and instructed her to follow him to a garage where he
sexually assaulted her. The driver sued the garage owner, and the su-
preme court rendered a take nothing judgment. Declining to classify the
plaintiff as an invitee, licensee, or trespasser, the court held that the de-
fendant owed no duty to prevent such an attack.192 It was not foresee-
able that a person would be accosted several blocks from the garage,
forced to drive to that garage, and then be sexually assaulted there. The
court concluded that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen
that its failure to secure the garage would lead to the plaintiff's injuries;
although it was foreseeable that an employee or visitor could be a victim
of violent crime there, it was not foreseeable that the plaintiff, of whom
the defendant had no knowledge, would be pulled over in her car by a
third person over whom the defendant had no control.193
Addressing what constitutes control over independent contractors, the
Texas Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff in Koch Refining Co. v.
Chapa.194 The plaintiff was hurt when a co-worker accidentally lost his
footing while helping plaintiff move a pipe. Before the accident, the
plaintiff had asked his supervisor, an independent contractor who had
hired plaintiff from an employee-leasing company, about the safety of the
way the pipe was to be lifted. Plaintiff hoped that the safety employee
hired by the premises owner would overhear the conversation and in-
struct plaintiff on how to move the pipe. The court held that a premises
owner, by merely placing a safety employee on the work site, does not
incur a duty to an independent contractor's employees to intervene and
insure that they safely perform their work. 195 The safety employee did
not exercise a right of supervision over the independent contractors, 196 as
he did not instruct the plaintiff on how to lift the pipe and did not control
or direct the employee, regardless of the employee's willingness to follow
the premise's owner's instructions.
190. Id. at 735.
191. 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 1999).
192. Id. at 658.
193. Id. at 657. The court distinguished Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546
(Tex. 1985), explaining that in Nixon the defendant was in violation of an ordinance de-
signed to prevent injury to the general public. Id. at 658-60.
194. 11 S.W.3d 153, 154 (Tex. 1999).
195. Id. at 156.
196. Id. at 155 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 414 cmt. a (1965)).
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In Texas Drydock, Inc. v. Davis, the plaintiff suffered an injury while
working for his employer on a cherry-picker crane owned by Texas Dry-
dock. 197 After a verdict for the plaintiff, defendant appealed, challenging
whether it controlled or had a right to control the premises at the time
the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff countered that his claim was not
for premises liability, but rather was based on section 323 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. This provision, adopted by the Texas Supreme
Court, provides that one who renders services to another which should be
recognized as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things,
is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from the
failure to exercise reasonable care to perform the undertaking if the fail-
ure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm, or the harm is suf-
fered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking. 198
Specifically, the plaintiff had asked a representative of defendant for
some non-skid tape and was told that "he would check into it to see if he
could find, and get, [plaintiff] some."'199 Several weeks passed and the
tape was not produced. Holding that a promise can constitute an under-
taking even if performance does not begin, the court found that the plain-
tiff had a cause of action under section 323 and that the defendant's
premises liability defenses were not relevant. 200
After two brothers drowned in a river that flooded while they were
fishing, their survivors sued the Texas Parks & Wildlife Department, the
owner of the park where the accident occurred, for wrongful death and
survival damages based on a premises liability theory.201 Ordinarily, a
plaintiff who brings a premises liability claim must prove that defendant
possessed-that is, owned, occupied or controlled,-the premises where
the injury occurred. A party who does not own, occupy, or control the
premises may nevertheless owe a duty of care if it undertakes to make the
premises safe for others. In this case, the river where the brothers
drowned was owned by the State of Texas, not the Texas Parks & Wildlife
Department. However, because there was evidence that the department
undertook the duty to make the river safe for park visitors and breached
that duty by not adequately warning visitors of the impending flood, the
Texas Supreme Court remanded the case for retrial of that issue.202
A distinction between a negligent-activity case and a premises-defect
case was drawn in Laurel v. Herschap.2°3 An employee of a subcontrac-
tor sued the general contractor for injuries sustained when a pipe fell on
him. Defendant HRS was sued because it allegedly supervised and con-
trolled the employee's activities that caused the pipe to be held in mid-
air. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not in
197. 4 S.W.3d 919, 921 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, no pet. h.).
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965).
199. Davis, 4 S.W.3d at 921.
200. Id. at 922-24.
201. Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dept., 8 S.W.3d 634, 638 (Tex. 1999).
202. Id. at 635-36.
203. 5 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet. h.).
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possession of the premises and had no knowledge of the defect that
caused plaintiff's injuries. The court affirmed the summary judgment for
the defendant. The court first determined that this was a negligent activ-
ity case and not a premises-defect case, because the pipe would not have
fallen on the plaintiff had defendant not caused the pipe to be suspended
in mid-air. 20 4 Defendant did not exercise any supervision, direction, or
control over the subcontractors in charge of moving the pipe. 20 5
2. Notice
In Whalen v. Condominium Consulting & Management Services, Inc.,
the plaintiff tripped on a boardwalk that was higher than the other
boards. 20 6 Although the plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she was
not looking at her feet when she tripped, she also testified that she felt
her foot hit the board and when she got up, she saw there was nothing
else on the boardwalk that could have caused her fall. The court found
sufficient evidence to show constructive notice because it was more likely
than not that the board had been protruding long enough that the defen-
dant should have noticed it. The court distinguished this case from Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez,20 7 a case in which the Texas Supreme Court
held that macaroni salad had not been on the Wal-Mart floor long enough
to charge Wal-Mart with constructive notice of the condition, even
though dirt was in the salad. In this case, the issue was not a foreign
substance, but an erosion of a boardwalk that had existed for a long pe-
riod of time.20 8
Macaroni was once again distinguished in M. Rivas Enterprises, Inc. v.
Gaytan, in which a grocery store customer slipped and fell on a puddle of
water that appeared to come from a leaking ice box.20 9 The court found
that the store had constructive knowledge because there was testimony
that customers had seen towels by the ice machine, that employees were
scolded about not mopping up the wet floor, and testimony that the leak
had existed for a long period of time.210
D. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
After a detailed analysis of supreme court precedent, the court in Aus-
tin v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp., rejected a proffered expert's testimony
because it did not show "general" causation with respect to whether ben-
204. Id. at 802.
205. Id. at 803.
206. 13 S.W.3d 444, 446 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).
207. 968 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1998).
208. Whalen, 13 S.W.3d at 448.
209. 24 S.W.3d 402, 403 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
210. Id. at 405-06; see also Purcell Constr., Inc. v. Welch, 17 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.) (finding the defendant had notice of a dangerous hole
that it had dug); Drew v. Harrison County Hosp. Assoc., 20 S.W.3d 244 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2000, no pet. h.) (finding summary judgment improper on a notice issue when testi-
mony showed that two of the defendant's employees had earlier complained of the same
kind of elevator drop that injured the plaintiff).
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zene exposure caused injury, or "specific" causation based on the specific
exposure of the plaintiff, and also failed to affirmatively exclude with rea-
sonable certainty other plausible alternative causes of plaintiff's condi-
tion.211 Conversely, in Ford Motor Co. v. Aguiniga, when a car
manufacturer did not present evidence of another cause that could have
led to an engine stall, an expert had in fact narrowed the cause to one
source, eliminating other possible causes for the stall.212 This case also
held that the circumstantial evidence offered to prove a design defect did
not amount to impermissible "inference stacking. '213
The case of Jorden v. Ensign-Bickford Co. presented an immunity issue
based on the alleged malfunction of a "stun grenade" manufactured for
the United States government for use by police forces.214 The trial court
granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim of design defect be-
cause the defendant established the government contractor defense. 21 5
The elements of the defense are: "(1) the United States approved reason-
ably precise specifications for the equipment at issue; (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United
States about any dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to
the supplier but not to the United States. ' 216 The first element may be
"satisfied by proof that the government accepted and used the product in
question in such a manner that its approval of the design can be pre-
sumed. '217 The defendant's proof was found lacking because the con-
tract at issue was not shown to be the same as the government-approved
specifications, and because the evidence as to continued use was incon-
clusive about the specific elements of the design and the length of time
the product was used. 218 Fact issues were found on other elements of the
defense as well.
Numerous products liability cases were heard by the federal courts this
year. In Dyer v. Danek Medical, Inc., the Northern District predicted
that Texas courts would apply the "learned intermediary" doctrine to spi-
nal fixation devices.219 After numerous back surgeries, a spinal fusion
fixation device was implanted in the plaintiff's spine, and several months
later the plaintiff began experiencing debilitating pain. The plaintiff sued
the doctor, the hospital, and the manufacturer of the device alleging nu-
merous claims, including products liability and failure to disclose. The
court held that Texas courts would apply the "learned intermediary" doc-
trine, and therefore, the plaintiff would be required to demonstrate that
the product supplier's failure to warn the doctor was a producing cause of
211. 25 S.W.3d 280, 292 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet. h.).
212. 9 S.W.3d 252, 265 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
213. Id. at 266.
214. 20 S.W.3d 847, 849 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).
215. Id. at 850.
216. Id. (citing Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-06 (1998)).
217. Id. at 850-51.
218. Id. at 851-54.
219. 115 F. Supp. 2d 732, 737 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
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the injury. 2 2 0
The learned intermediary doctrine was also addressed by the Southern
District in Anderson v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.221 In that case, the
plaintiff took a drug, Parlodel, to treat hyperprolactimia while she was
pregnant. The drug company did not recommend that the drug be used
to treat the plaintiff's problem and therefore did not warn of side effects,
including vasoconstriction, which ultimately caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Noting that the learned intermediary doctrine only requires that the man-
ufacturer warn the doctor and not the patient, the court held that there
was insufficient evidence that the doctor was adequately warned by the
manufacturer. 222 Consequently, the defendant's motion for summary
judgment was denied.223
Finally, the Eastern District addressed a matter of first impression in
Milbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,224 holding that the Texas statute
prohibiting evidence showing whether a plaintiff was wearing a seat belt
is substantive and, therefore, must be applied by a federal court adjudi-
cating a case in which jurisdiction is based on diversity.22 5 The court held
that the Texas seat belt statute does not violate the equal protection
clause, and excluded evidence, including expert testimony, that the de-
ceased was not wearing his seat belt at the time of the accident.226
E. BATTERY
The issue in Bailey v. C.S. was whether a four-year-old child could form
the intent to commit the tort of battery.227 The court of appeals reasoned
that "there is currently no specific age at which minors are immune from
liability for intentional torts as a matter of law," and reversed a summary
judgment for the child on this point.228 The court distinguished Williams
v. Lavender,229 which held that a child must be at least twelve to be liable
for wilful and malicious conduct, on the basis that Williams dealt with
whether a minor could form the malicious intent to sustain an award of
exemplary damages rather than the mental state needed to commit
battery.230
F. LIQUOR LIABILITY
The case of Daniel v. Reeder involved a suit by a minor complaining of
220. Id. at 741.
221. 77 F. Supp. 2d 804 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
222. Id. at 808-09.
223. Id. at 809.
224. 105 F. Supp. 2d 601 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
225. Id. at 604-05. See also TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 545.413(g) (Vernon Supp.
2001).
226. Milbrand, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 608.
227. 12 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).
228. Id. at 163.
229. 797 S.W.2d 410, 412 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
230. Bailey, 12 S.W.3d at 162.
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injuries he suffered at a party where alcohol was served.231 The court of
appeals concluded that section 106.06 of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage
Code creates a duty for third parties not to provide alcohol to party
guests under the age of eighteen.232 It further concluded that the statute
set the standard of care for the purpose of civil liability. Summary judg-
ment was proper for the parents of the boy who hosted the party, because
the record showed that the alcohol consumed there was purchased by
other third parties. However, there was a fact issue about their son's lia-
bility, even though he did not purchase the alcohol himself. The court
reasoned that "[i]t is at least arguable" that by hosting the party he made
the alcohol available within the meaning of the statute.233 A dissent ar-
gued that, under the supreme court's ruling in Smith v. Merritt,234 Texas
law at present provides liability against commercial providers only.235
Boggs v. Bottomless Pit Cooking Team turned on foreseeability. 236 The
question was whether the operators of a booth serving alcohol at a barbe-
cue cook-off could foresee that a third party could become intoxicated,
violent, and kill the decedent.237 The court concluded that the interven-
ing act of murder by the drinker was not foreseeable. 238 Generally, it
"was not the kind of harm that would have otherwise resulted from the
[defendant's] negligent sale of alcoholic beverages," and no other evi-
dence showed that any employee should have known that the third party
would get into a fight with the plaintiff and kill him.239
G. FALSE IMPRISONMENT
The "shopkeeper's privilege" was discussed in Raiford v. May Depart-
ment Stores Co.240 The court of appeals upheld the jury's finding of no
liability based on the affirmative defense of "shopkeeper's privilege,"
holding that the privilege includes a right to conduct a contemporaneous
search.241 A jury instruction regarding such a search is not objectionable
as a comment on the weight of the evidence. 242
H. WRONGFUL DEATH
A transsexual who was born a man but who underwent sex reassign-
ment surgery to become a woman lacked standing to bring a claim as her
231. 16 S.W.3d 491, 492 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet. h.).
232. Id. at 494.
233. Id. at 494-95. The trial court affirmed summary judgment for the son on a negli-
gence claim alleging that he encouraged the use of force, finding that the fight which in-
jured the plaintiff began with no foreknowledge by anyone. Id. at 496.
234. 940 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1997).
235. Daniel, 16 S.W.3d. at 496 (Walker, J., dissenting).
236. 25 S.W.3d 818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet. h.).
237. Id. at 822.
238. Id. at 825.
239. Id. at 824-25 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442 (1965)).
240. 2 S.W.3d 527 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
241. Id. at 531.
242. Id. at 532.
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husband's surviving spouse (of seven years) under wrongful death and
survival statutes in Littleton v. Prange.243 The San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals held as a matter of law that a ceremonial marriage between a man
and a transsexual born as a man, but surgically and chemically altered to
have the physical characteristics of a woman, was not valid because Texas
does not permit marriages between persons of the same sex.244
I. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
Issues concerning malicious prosecution were addressed in Lewis v.
Continental Airlines, Inc.,245 which discussed the arrest of a Continental
customer who allegedly made comments about bombs after missing his
flight. The court ultimately held that Continental was not liable for mali-
cious prosecution because merely reporting facts to the proper authorities
does not amount to initiating or procuring a criminal prosecution. 246 Sig-
nificant to the court's analysis was that Continental did not file charges
against the customer, but rather a Continental employee merely called
security after the customer made comments about having a bomb in his
bag and made a witness statement at the officer's request.
III. DEFENSES
In Chavez v. City of San Antonio a volunteer tree trimmer sued the city
board that operated power lines for damages he sustained when a tree
limb fell on a line.2 47 In affirming a summary judgment for the city, the
court found that Chavez violated the Health and Safety Code by failing
to notify the board of his work and by bringing the tree limb within six
feet of the line.2 48 It also found he was responsible for the work because
he exercised control over the work site.249 Because Chavez was responsi-
ble for the work and he violated the Code, he had to indemnify CPS for
any damages it may have incurred as a result of his conduct, which effec-
tively precluded any recovery.250
In Hernandez v. Koch Machinery Co., a worker whose arm was severed
while working on a steel slitting line sued the marketer and seller of the
line for products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty, claiming a
design defect caused his injury.251 The district court entered summary
judgment for the marketer on all claims based on a statute of repose, and
the court of appeals reversed. The statute of repose operates like a stat-
ute of limitations except it potentially cuts off a right of action before it
243. 9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
244. Id. at 231.
245. 80 F. Supp. 2d 686 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
246. Id. at 701.
247. 21 S.W.3d 435 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
248. Id. at 440.
249. Id. at 439.
250. Id. at 438-39.
251. 16 S.W.3d 48 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. filed).
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accrues.2 52 Koch Machinery was not entitled to statute of repose protec-
tion because its work was not sufficiently related to the actual attachment
of the splitting line to the property.2 53
Religious constitutional issues were addressed in Turner v. Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, in which a former missionary brought
multiple tort claims against his church for injuries he allegedly suffered
during and after his missionary work in Guatemala.2 54 Noting that the
free exercise clause bars government involvement in disputes concerning
the structure, leadership, or internal policies of religious institutions, the
court held if the plaintiff won his lawsuit, government regulation through
the courts would require the church to augment its training program to
teach numerous subjects to its missionaries.2 55 Furthermore, his claims
concerning the missionary program and its training program did not "in-
volve provision of a secular service separable from the religious
activity." 256
The case of Hawkins v. Trinity Baptist Church arose from a sexual rela-
tionship between a church pastor and a parishioner.2 57 The aggrieved pa-
rishioner and her husband sued the pastor and the church for violation of
the Sexual Exploitation by Mental Health Services Provider Act.258 The
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court of
appeals found that the minister failed to meet his summary judgment bur-
den to prove that his conduct constituted "religious, moral, and spiritual
counseling, teaching and instruction" so as to remove it from the scope of
this act.259 His constitutional defense was rejected because his conduct,
not his communications, were at issue.2 60 The plaintiff also alleged a
claim for breach of a fiduciary relationship, arising from the pastor-mem-
ber relationship. No such cause of action has been recognized in Texas
and the court expressed concern about creating one for policy reasons.2 61
As for the church, however, no evidence showed that the minister was
hired "for any purpose other than to provide religious, moral, and spiri-
tual counseling," thus meaning there was no duty to inquire about his
previous record.262
In Grant v. Southwestern Electric Power Co., an electric utility cus-
tomer sued the utility for negligence, alleging personal injuries and prop-
252. Id. at 52.
253. Id. at 55 (citing Sonnier v. Chisolm-Ryder Co., 909 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. 1995)).
254. 18 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet. h.).
255. Id. at 889, 894.
256. Id. at 894; see also Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54, 60 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (applying doctrine of "ecclesiastical immunity" to defeat
defamation claim).
257. 30 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet. h.).
258. Id. at 448; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 81.001-009 (Vernon 1997).
259. Hawkins, 30 S.W.3d at 451 (citing TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 81.001(7) (Vernon 1997)).
260. Id. at 452.
261. Id. at 452-53 (citing Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J.,
concurring and dissenting)).
262. Id. at 454.
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erty damage due to electrical problems in her home.263 The district court
entered summary judgment in favor of utility, and the court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part. Summary judgment was appropri-
ate as to property damage because of the public utility tariff's limitation
of liability.264 A public utility tariff lists a public utility services and rates
and acts as a binding contract between the utility company and its cus-
tomers. As for personal injury, the liability limitation was found to be
prima facie unconscionable.2 65
IV. OTHER ISSUES
A. INSURANCE
In Henson v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., the su-
preme court identified when an insurer obligated to pay uninsured/under-
insured benefits would have to pay prejudgment interest as well.266
Prejudgment interest is awarded only if necessary to compensate an in-
jured party for the time that the proceeds he was entitled to receive were
withheld. Thus, prejudgment interest runs from the date of entitlement.
In the context of uninsured/underinsured benefits, an insured is only enti-
tled to the benefits once an insurer's contractual obligation to pay those
benefits is triggered, which occurs when the tort liability of the uninsured/
underinsured motorist is established. 267 Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that prejudgment interest begins running from the date that the
liability of the motorist is established. 268 Thus, an insurer only owes pre-
judgment interest if it withholds benefits after tort liability is established.
In this case, the insurers paid the benefits upon tort liability being estab-
lished and, therefore, were not liable for prejudgment interest.2 69
In another prejudgment interest case, Embrey v. Royal Insurance Co.
of America, the supreme court held that a commercial automobile liabil-
ity policy did not require the insurer to pay prejudgment interest, in addi-
tion to the policy limits, on a claim by a third party against its insured.270
In an agreed judgment in the suit between Royal's insured and Embrey,
the trial court awarded Embrey $678,050 and prejudgment interest.
Royal paid the principal but refused to pay the prejudgment award be-
cause the principal exhausted the policy limits. The court of appeals
agreed that, because the policy limits had been exhausted, the explicit
policy language precluded a recovery of prejudgment interest.27 1 The
court also concluded that a Supplementary Payments Provision only pro-
263. 20 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. granted).
264. Id. at 776.
265. Id. at 772, 776.
266. 17 S.W.3d 652 (Tex. 2000).
267. Id. at 654.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 22 S.W.3d 414 (Tex. 2000).
271. Id. at 416.
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vided for the payment of postjudgment interest. 272 Finally, the court held
that State Board of Insurance General Casualty Bulletin No. 644, which
approved an amendatory endorsement stating that all general liability in-
surance policies effective on or after October 1, 1984 provide coverage
for prejudgment interest, did not apply to Royal's policy because the Or-
der did not explicitly say it applied to automobile liability insurance.2 73
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In Smith v. Universal Electric Construction Co., an employer was held
not liable for injuries sustained by a motorcyclist hit by an employee's
personal vehicle as the employee returned to a company-paid motel room
after work. 274 The trial court granted the employer's motion for directed
verdict, finding no evidence that the employee was operating within the
course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and the
court of appeals affirmed.275 The court of appeals looked for evidence
that the employee's act was: "(1) within the general authority given him;
(2) in furtherance of the employer's business; and (3) for the accomplish-
ment of the object for which the employee was employed. '276 The plain-
tiff claimed that the trip from the worksite to the motel was part of a
"special mission" on behalf of Universal or constituted a dual purpose.2 77
The court of appeals disagreed, noting that the employee was driving his
own personal vehicle after he had ended his workday, repaired the vehi-
cle at his own expense, was not reimbursed by his employer for the use of
the vehicle, and was not furthering any business purpose of the employer
by driving to a motel after work, even though the employer paid for the
motel room for the employee's convenience during a temporary job as-
signment.2 78 The plaintiff's evidence that he was paid for twelve hours of
work the day of the accident, which would have included the time of the
accident, was not probative, because the employee's hours varied from
day to day and were not recorded by a time clock. 279
Taking the theory of vicarious liability for a car accident even further,
the plaintiff in Greg Lair, Inc. v. Spring sought to hold a car dealership
and its salesman liable for an accident caused by a prospective buyer dur-
ing a test drive.280 The trial judge found the dealership and salesman
vicariously liable as a matter of law because the prospective buyer was
engaged in a joint enterprise with the dealership and salesman.281 The
court of appeals noted that the joint enterprise theory had four elements:
272. Id.
273. Id. at 417.
274. 30 S.W.3d 435, 441 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, no pet. h.).
275. Id. at 438.
276. Id. (citing Mata v. Andrews Transp., Inc., 900 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)).
277. Id. at 439.
278. Id. at 439-41.
279. Id. at 441.
280. 23 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. granted).
281. Id. at 445.
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"(1) an agreement, expressed or implied among the members with a com-
mon purpose, (2) a common purpose, (3) a right, expressed or implied, to
direct and control the enterprise, and (4) a common business or pecuni-
ary interest. '282 The court found that the plaintiff's summary judgment
evidence did not establish a common pecuniary interest,28 3 based on the
1931 case of Bertrand v. Mutual Motor Co., which held that a dealer was
not liable for a prospective buyer's negligence during a test drive. 284 That
court further held that the buyer could not be an agent of the dealer,
since the buyer and dealer's interests were antagonistic. 285 Because these
conflicting interests prevent the existence of a common pecuniary inter-
est, no joint enterprise existed between the defendants, and the plaintiff
could recover nothing from the dealership or salesman. 286
C. WORKERS' COMPENSATION
A workers' compensation subrogation claim gave rise to Harris County
v. Carr, in which a self-insured county and its employee filed a negligence
suit in October 1997 against a driver who had injured the employee in a
February 1994 car accident.287 The Houston First District Court of Ap-
peals affirmed summary judgment on limitations. The court found that
although Harris County may claim a general limitations exemption avail-
able to many governmental entities under section 16.061(a) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code,288 that exemption does not apply
when the governmental entity asserts a claim that belongs to a non-ex-
empted person or entity.289 Here, Harris County's subrogation claim ac-
tually belonged to the injured employee, who was subject to a two-year
limitations period,290 and thus the county's suit was barred.291
The plaintiff in Conex International Corp. v. Cox claimed retaliation for
asserting rights under the Texas Workers Compensation Act.292 The jury
awarded him $50,000 because his employer refused to let him follow his
doctor's orders in connection with a hand injury. The employer argued
that because the plaintiff had received workers compensation benefits for
the injury, his recovery was barred by the doctrine of "election of reme-
282. Id. at 445; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 491 cmt. c (1965).
283. Greg Lair, Inc., 23 S.W.3d at 448.
284. 38 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1931, writ ref'd).
285. Id.
286. Greg Lair, Inc. v. Spring, 23 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2000, pet.
granted). The prospective buyer was not a party to the appeal, and all other parties agreed
that they would not seek to collect any judgment against the buyer personally in excess of
his cumulative insurance policy limits. See id. at 445 n.2.
287. 11 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2000, Rule 53.7(f) motion filed for
extension of time to file pet.).
288. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.061(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
289. See Carr, 11 S.W.3d at 344.
290. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
291. See Carr, 11 S.W.3d at 344.
292. 18 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied).
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dies."'293 The court of appeals agreed and reversed the trial court.294 The
court was unpersuaded by the fact that the plaintiff had not filed a claim
for benefits, reasoning that the doctrine applied once benefits were
accepted.295
D. NEW STATUTES
Numerous statutes relating to topics addressed in this Article were
amended this Survey year, most of which were effective September 1,
1999.296 Most notable were numerous changes to the Civil Practices and
Remedies Code and changes to the Labor Code (addressing both em-
ployment issues and Workers' Compensation issues). 297 Several legisla-
tive changes were made to Workers' Compensation law this year. Some
of the changes to the Labor Code involved issues concerning annual sick
leave,298 interlocutory orders, 299 intoxication levels, 300 medical bills and
exams, 30 1 returning injured employees to work, 302 and volunteers. 30 3
Several changes are particularly relevant to employers, including statutes
addressing the disclosure of information about employees, 30 4 wrongful
termination of employees on jury duty,30 5 and employer responsibility for
leased employees. 306 The Civil Practice and Remedies Code was
amended to address several issues, including the application of a four-
year statute of limitations for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty
293. Id. at 325.
294. Id. at 326-27 (citing Massey v. Armco Steel, 652 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Tex. 1983)).
295. Id. at 327.
296. See generally WILLIAM V. DORSANEO, III, TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE; J. HADLEY
EDGAR, JR. & JAMES B. SALES, TEXAS TORTS & REMEDIES; JOHN C. KILPATRICK, TEXAS
WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW.
297. See supra Part IV.C.
298. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 501.044 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (addressing exhaustion of
sick leave and income benefits).
299. Id. §§ 410.032, 410.168.
300. Id. § 401.013 (specifying that the alcohol concentration that renders a person in-
toxicated for purposes of the workers' compensation laws is .08, as specified in the TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.01(2)).
301. Id. §§ 408.027 (requiring insurance carriers to pay the fee allowed under section
413.011 for service rendered by a health care provider rather than the fee charged), 408.151
(Vernon Supp. 2001) (limiting the number of medical examinations that may be required of
an employee receiving supplemental income benefits).
302. Id. § 408.150 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (addressing the need for vocational rehabilita-
tion and training services).
303. Id. § 501.026 (providing for payment of medical expenses to volunteers injured by
performing volunteer services for the state during a disaster or scheduled emergency re-
sponse training).
304. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 103.003(b) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (allowing an employer to
disclose job performance information concerning a current or former employee to a pro-
spective employer).
305. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.022 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (increasing
the penalties for firing an employee because the employee served as a juror).
306. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 91.032 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (providing that a company
that leases employees through a staff leasing service retains responsibility for the direction
and control of the employees, the goods and services produced by the company, and the




claims,30 7 governmental liability,30 8 limitations on governmental suits
brought against gun and ammunition manufacturers, 30 9 and health care
provider immunity.310
E. CLASS ACTIONS
Rejecting the "certify now and worry later" approach, the supreme
court denied certification in Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, in which
over 900 plaintiffs brought a class action against a refining company alleg-
ing personal injuries resulting from a tank explosion at the refinery. 31'
Plaintiffs, residents of the surrounding area near the explosion, alleged
that the explosion and ensuing fire caused respiratory difficulties, skin
irritation, eye irritation, headaches, nausea, lawn spoilage, and pet deaths.
The trial court certified the class and divided the proceedings into three
phases: (1) determination of general liability and gross negligence; (2)
determination of punitive damages; and (3) determination of causation
and actual damages. The court of appeals modified the certification or-
der to require determination of actual damages before punitive damages
were assessed for the whole class.312
The supreme court reversed, noting that certification is rarely an ap-
propriate device in personal injury cases because they often present diffi-
cult "causation and damages issues with highly individualistic
variables. '313 The court held that individual issues predominated over
common ones, including the proximity of the explosion to the plaintiffs'
homes, the prevailing winds on the day in question, the location of the
plaintiffs at the time of the explosion, and the plaintiffs' individual medi-
cal history.314 The court rejected any relaxation of individualized treat-
ment of causation and damages in the mass tort context, noting that
"[aIggregating claims can dramatically alter substantive tort jurispru-
dence [because] [u]nder the traditional tort model, recovery is condi-
tioned on defendant responsibility. '31 5 Specifically, the plaintiff must
prove, and the defendant must be given an opportunity to contest, every
element of a claim. Thus, the Court held, it is improper to certify a class
307. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
308. Id. § 101.0215 (adding school latch-key programs to the list of governmental activi-
ties to which the Texas Tort Claims Act applies); id. § 75.002 (limiting municipal liability in
connection with recreational activities).
309. Id. § 128.001(b).
310. Id. §§ 84.003-.004 (providing immunity to health care providers working as volun-
teers for charitable organizations).
311. 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000). The supreme court addressed class definition is-
sues in two other cases this Survey year. See Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22 S.W.3d 398,
403 (Tex. 2000) (holding that "class members must be presently ascertainable by reference
to objective criteria"); Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon, 22 S.W.3d 444, 454 (Tex. 2000) (denying
certification of class of automobile buyers who suffered damages from peeling paint be-
cause the class definition, which required a determination of the merits, failed to meet the
"clearly ascertainable" requirements).
312. Southwestern Refining Co., 22 S.W.3d at 429.
313. Id. at 436.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 438.
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without knowing how the claims will likely be tried.316 The Court went
on to say that "[b]y removing individual considerations from the adver-
sarial process, the tort system is shorn of a valuable method for screening
out marginal and unfounded claims. In this way, 'class certification mag-
nifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims." 317
F. GOVERNMENTAL OR OFFICIAL IMMUNITY
Numerous Texas courts addressed immunity under the Texas Tort
Claims Act 318 this year. Perhaps the most significant opinion was the su-
preme court ruling in Texas Department of Transportation v. Jones that
governmental immunity defeats subject matter jurisdiction and is thus
properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.319 The court distinguished
"immunity from liability" from "immunity from suit." Immunity from li-
ability can be waived and is not a jurisdictional bar. By contrast, immu-
nity from suit cannot be waived, and the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction absent consent to suit.320 Of course, a court may only con-
sider the plaintiff's pleadings in determining whether waiver exists, and
thus whether subject matter jurisdiction exists or not.321
The difference between respondeat superior liability and premises de-
fect liability in relation to governmental immunity was addressed in City
of Baytown v. Peoples.322 The court explained that in premises defect
cases, a governmental entity may not rely on its employee's official immu-
nity "because its liability would be based, not on the actions of its em-
ployee, but on a condition of tangible personal property. ' 323 The
plaintiff's failure to warn of a dangerous situation created by a malfunc-
tioning traffic signal and failure to fix the signal was a premises defect
issue.324 Thus, the City was not immune despite the City employee's offi-
cial immunity.32 5
By contrast, another court of appeals held in Cameron County v. Ca-
riUo, that a governmental entity was immune where an employee was
protected from liability under the doctrine of official immunity.32 6 The
court based its holding on the fact that the Texas Tort Claims Act waives
316. Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).
317. Id. at 438 (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996)).
318. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.001-.109 (Vernon 1997).
319. 8 S.W.3d 636, 637 (Tex. 1999).
320. Id. at 638 (distinguishing Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.
1988)). But see City of Houston v. Lazell-Mosier, 5 S.W.3d 887, 891 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.) (holding that an averment that "all conditions precedent have
occurred or have been performed" is sufficient to invoke subject matter jurisdiction of the
court with regard to the notice issue).
321. See Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 639; City of San Augustine v. Parrish, 10 S.W.3d 734, 737
(Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, no pet. h.); Montgomery County v. Fuqua, 22 S.W.3d 662, 665
(Tex. App.-Beaumont 2000, no pet. h.).
322. 9 S.W.3d 391, 395-96 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
323. Id. at 394.
324. Id. at 396.
325. Id.
326. 7 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet. h.).
[Vol. 541590
PERSONAL TORTS
sovereign immunity only where the government would be liable if it were
a private person.32 7 Because the private person was granted official im-
munity, the government could not be held liable. The court did not dis-
cuss the distinction between premises defect liability and respondeat
superior liability.
In an unpublished opinion, the Texas Supreme Court found Texas A &
M University liable under the Tort Claims Act for stab wounds sustained
by a student who portrayed Vlad the Impaler in the university drama club
performance of "Dracula. ' 328 The injury occurred when another student
actor wielding a Bowie knife missed the stab pad on the plaintiff's
chest.32 9 A jury found that the play's director, the prop master (who cho-
reographed the stage fight), and two faculty advisors were acting as uni-
versity employees during the accident and "were negligent in their use of
tangible personal property. '330 The court of appeals reversed, finding
that the director and prop master were independent contractors, and the
two faculty advisors were not acting in their paid academic roles at the
time.331 The supreme court determined that there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury finding that the faculty advisors were university em-
ployees at the time of the accident, because they were responsible for
enforcing university policies and procedures during the club's activities,
and their position as faculty advisors was relevant to their overall
compensation. 332
Waiver of governmental immunity under section 101.060 of the Texas
Tort Claims Act was addressed by several courts this year. Under that
section, immunity is waived if "the absence, condition, or malfunction of
a traffic or road sign... is not corrected by the responsible governmental
unit within a reasonable time after notice. '333 In Reyes v. City of Hous-
ton, survivors of three young men who died in a car accident when their
car ran off the end of a dead-end road and hit a chain link fence sued
under the Texas Tort Claims Act alleging that the City of Houston was
negligent for its failure to warn of and barricade the dead-end.334 The
City's plea to the jurisdiction was denied because the City had notice of a
similar accident that had occurred at the same location the month before
the accident at issue.335 In State ex rel. State Department of Highways and
Public Transportations v. Gonzalez, the court held that repeated vandal-
ism of a stop sign can be considered a "condition" for purposes of section
101.060.336 In that case, governmental immunity was waived after a stop
sign was vandalized six times in a seventeen-day period, resulting in a
327. Id.
328. Bishop v. Tex. A & M Univ., No. 99-0634, 2000 WL 854300 (Tex. June 29, 2000).
329. Id. at *1.
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. Id. at *2.
333. TEX. CIv. PRAC, & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.060(2) (Vernon 1997).
334. 4 S.W.3d 459, 461 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet. h.).
335. Id. at 462.
336. 24 S.W.3d 533, 537 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
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fatal accident. Because the city failed to take corrective action (increased
patrolling) until the sixth incident, the court held that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to determine that the State's failure to take correc-
tive action was unreasonable. 337
Two cases addressed governmental immunity in relation to an emer-
gency services' failure to timely respond. In both cases, the courts held
that governmental immunity is not waived by the failure to act. In City of
Hildalgo Ambulance Service v. Lira, the court held that the failure to use
and the misuse of information in an emergency situation "does not
amount to use or misuse of tangible property. ' 338 In that case, plaintiffs
attempted to circumvent well settled law that there is no waiver of immu-
nity for the non-use of a motor-driven vehicle by alleging that defendants
waived their governmental immunity by using or misusing tangible prop-
erty - specifically, emergency communications equipment.339 In a similar
case, the court held that governmental immunity was not waived after
EMS personnel refused to transport a patient from one hospital to an-
other despite the fact that the failure to transport resulted in the untimely
death of the patient. 340
The claim in Hampton v. University of Texas - M.D. Anderson Cancer
Center was that a hospital provided a poorly-designed bed to a patient
and then misused the bed by not activating the safety equipment.341 The
hospital obtained summary judgment by claiming that these allegations
involved a "non-use" of government property, which is not actionable
under the Texas Tort Claims Act. 342 The court of appeals disagreed and
reversed, characterizing the claim as one for a failure to properly use
property. It observed: "If the hospital had really not used the bed, it
would have retained possession and not have provided the bed to [the
patient]."343
The protective umbrella of sovereign immunity was extended to a non-
profit corporation because it constituted a workforce board in accordance
with a Texas statute and was thus a governmental entity in Alamo
Workforce Development, Inc. v. Vann.344 However, the court specifically
noted its unwillingness to extend the "blanket of sovereign immunity to
every entity which at first blush exhibits the characteristics of a govern-
mental entity. '345
In Guillen v. City of San Antonio, the City of San Antonio was immune
from a suit filed against it after a doctor's wife died as a result of
paramedics' alleged violations of standard medical operating procedures
337. Id.
338. 17 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet. h.).
339. Id.
340. City of El Paso v. Hernandez, 16 S.W.3d 409 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, pet.
denied).
341. 6 S.W.3d 627 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
342. Id. at 630.
343. Id. at 631.




set by the San Antonio Fire Department. 346 Although immunity is
waived if a claim arises from a municipal employee's violation of a statute
or ordinance in responding to a 9-1-1 call, the court refused to expand the
statute to include departmental guidelines, which are created by a legisla-
tive body and therefore are not a statute or ordinance. 347
In a well publicized federal case, the Western District court addressed
liability issues under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") concerning
children who died in the 1993 Branch Davidian conflict. 348 Considering
the plaintiffs' motions to recuse, reopen, and reconsider the granting of a
motion to dismiss and partial summary judgment, the judge denied all of
the claimants' motions and set forth his findings of fact and conclusions of
law, examining separately the events of the initial service of warrants that
led to the stand-off and its eventual fiery conclusion. 349 Applying Texas
tort law, the court first summarized the state's tort law as it applies to
infants, children, and adults.350 Using these principles, the court found
that: (1) the plaintiff's claims were barred under the discretionary func-
tion exception of the FITCA;351 (2) the agents of the Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms ("ATF") acted reasonably and lawfully in at-
tempting to serve warrants at the compound;352 (3) the ATF and Federal
Bureau of Investigation officers were privileged under Texas law to use
force as necessary when performing official duties;353 (4) the use of tanks
and tear gas was reasonable to end the fifty-one-day stand-off;354 (5) cer-
tain Davidians who started a fire in the compound were a superseding
cause of its damage who "broke any purported causal connection be-
tween the damage to the building and the Plaintiffs' injuries; '355 and (6)
the United States owed no duty to rescue Davidians "from a peril it did
not cause. '356
A negligence suit, Michaels v. Avitech, Inc.,357 was brought by the exec-
utor of two people killed in a private plane crash against a company that
replaced one of the vacuum pumps on the plane four years before the
crash. The Southern District of Texas court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed sum-
mary judgment, examining each of the plaintiff's negligence theories in
turn: (1) Avitech introduced debris contamination into the pumps when it
replaced one of them, (2) Avitech spent an insufficient amount of time
replacing the pump, and (3) the right pump caused the left pump to fail,
346. 13 S.W.3d 428, 432 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, pet. denied).
347. Id. at 433.
348. Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
349. Id. at 783-90.
350. See id. at 786-87.
351. See id. at 787-89.
352. See id. at 787.
353. See id. at 788-89.
354. Andrade v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 2d 778 (W.D. Tex. 2000).
355. Id. at 789.
356. Id.
357. 202 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2000).
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which set off a chain reaction resulting in the crash. The court found that
the plaintiff made no attempt to rule out other sources of contamination
or other causes of pump failure, nor did the plaintiff provide expert evi-
dence that Avitech spent an insufficient amount of time replacing the
pump.358 The court also opined that the plaintiff's expert evidence
"would likely have been inadmissible at trial under Daubert because it
failed to exclude other causes. '359
G. DAMAGES
The Fifth Circuit ruled in Srivastava v. Commissioner that the portion
of damages payable to an attorney as part of a contingent fee arrange-
ment is not gross income for tax purposes. 360 The petitioners settled a
defamation case for 8.5 million dollars, none of which they reported as
gross income. The Fifth Circuit, reviewing a decision of the Tax Court,
recognized that the federal circuit courts were split on the issue of taxing
contingency fees to the client, but was bound by its previous decision in a
1959 case arising under Alabama law.361
Damages were also addressed by the Southern District in Holland v.
United States, a tax refund case in which the petitioner claimed that dis-
bursements from a trust fund were in exchange for the relinquishment of
personal injury tort rights against Phillips 66 Company, which set up the
trust in exchange for land next to one of its commercial operations. 3
62
The petitioner claimed that she overpaid income taxes on the trust dis-
bursement and was seeking a refund, but the court found that the only
personal injury tort right she could have relinquished as part of the prop-
erty transfer was nuisance causing emotional harm.363 Finding no evi-
dence that petitioner could assert such a tort claim, the court held that
the trust disbursement was taxable as income.3
64
358. Id. at 753-54.
359. Id. at 753 (referring to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).
360. 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000).
361. Id. at 358, 364-65 (referring to Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir.
1959)).
362. 94 F. Supp. 2d 787 (S.D. Tex. 2000).
363. Id. at 791.
364. Id. at 792.
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